Is the era of secret programs over?
Satellites have long helped states to observe places where you can not just come with an inspection. From the orbit you can see the construction, damage, new roads, equipment and other signs of activity in closed areas. But for nuclear safety, images are often not enough. It is necessary to notice physical traces that may indicate the work with nuclear materials or tests.
Scientists from the University of Florida are developing space technology for remote sensing, which should make such an observation more accurately. The team creates sensors to search from orbit very weak signals related to nuclear activity. Ideally, the system will be able to notice signs of the proliferation of nuclear technology even where the facility is disguised as a normal infrastructure.
The work is supported by a consortium on nuclear forensics. They are led by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Threat Reduction Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Nuclear forensics helps to disassemble the incidents on the basis of materials, traces and data: what happened, where the substances could come from and who could be involved. In space, the task becomes more difficult. Signs must be recognized from a huge distance, through the atmosphere and against the background of natural interference.
The University of Florida is led by two groups led by Kyle Hartiga and James Bachiak of the Astraeus Space Institute. The first group deals with radiation detectors for orbit. Such devices should look for weak signals from nuclear materials. The second studies optical and X-ray techniques that can help detect and analyze nuclear tests from space, including low-power or hidden tests.
The most difficult part is not just to catch an unusual signal. The satellite should distinguish the trace of nuclear activity from background radiation, atmospheric effects, natural processes and device errors. Otherwise, the system will either miss an important event or take a common phenomenon for the threat. Therefore, researchers are working not only on sensor sensitivity, but also on deciphering data.
Space systems give a serious advantage: satellites can regularly look at areas where inspectors are not allowed. But orbital technology lives in a rigid framework. The device should have a small mass and size, low energy consumption and high resistance to space conditions. The detector needs to be made easy enough to run, reliable for long-term operation and sensitive to very weak signals.
The team does not disclose the technical details of the projects, probably due to the military and intelligence sensitivity of the topic. It is known that the work combines physics, materials science, sensor design and data analysis. There's not a good detector here. It is necessary to select materials for the orbital device, reduce noise, process the flow of measurements and connect the signal with a specific event on Earth.
The researchers believe that these technologies will help not only to monitor possible nuclear facilities. Orbital sensors may be useful in verifying nuclear test agreements, dismantling disputed events and establishing the origin of nuclear material. If the system records a suspicious signal, the subsequent analysis must show what happened: test, accident, work with materials or false response.
A separate part of the project is related to the training of specialists. Space nuclear safety needs people who understand nuclear physics, satellites, sensor engineering limitations, and complex data processing. The University of Florida wants to train such people in an academic environment, not just in closed state laboratories.
Satellites have long helped states to observe places where you can not just come with an inspection. From the orbit you can see the construction, damage, new roads, equipment and other signs of activity in closed areas. But for nuclear safety, images are often not enough. It is necessary to notice physical traces that may indicate the work with nuclear materials or tests.
Scientists from the University of Florida are developing space technology for remote sensing, which should make such an observation more accurately. The team creates sensors to search from orbit very weak signals related to nuclear activity. Ideally, the system will be able to notice signs of the proliferation of nuclear technology even where the facility is disguised as a normal infrastructure.
The work is supported by a consortium on nuclear forensics. They are led by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Threat Reduction Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Nuclear forensics helps to disassemble the incidents on the basis of materials, traces and data: what happened, where the substances could come from and who could be involved. In space, the task becomes more difficult. Signs must be recognized from a huge distance, through the atmosphere and against the background of natural interference.
The University of Florida is led by two groups led by Kyle Hartiga and James Bachiak of the Astraeus Space Institute. The first group deals with radiation detectors for orbit. Such devices should look for weak signals from nuclear materials. The second studies optical and X-ray techniques that can help detect and analyze nuclear tests from space, including low-power or hidden tests.
The most difficult part is not just to catch an unusual signal. The satellite should distinguish the trace of nuclear activity from background radiation, atmospheric effects, natural processes and device errors. Otherwise, the system will either miss an important event or take a common phenomenon for the threat. Therefore, researchers are working not only on sensor sensitivity, but also on deciphering data.
Space systems give a serious advantage: satellites can regularly look at areas where inspectors are not allowed. But orbital technology lives in a rigid framework. The device should have a small mass and size, low energy consumption and high resistance to space conditions. The detector needs to be made easy enough to run, reliable for long-term operation and sensitive to very weak signals.
The team does not disclose the technical details of the projects, probably due to the military and intelligence sensitivity of the topic. It is known that the work combines physics, materials science, sensor design and data analysis. There's not a good detector here. It is necessary to select materials for the orbital device, reduce noise, process the flow of measurements and connect the signal with a specific event on Earth.
The researchers believe that these technologies will help not only to monitor possible nuclear facilities. Orbital sensors may be useful in verifying nuclear test agreements, dismantling disputed events and establishing the origin of nuclear material. If the system records a suspicious signal, the subsequent analysis must show what happened: test, accident, work with materials or false response.
A separate part of the project is related to the training of specialists. Space nuclear safety needs people who understand nuclear physics, satellites, sensor engineering limitations, and complex data processing. The University of Florida wants to train such people in an academic environment, not just in closed state laboratories.
