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  1. Depov

    Lateral Movement from IT to OT: Industrial Network Pentest Techniques

    At the audit of the energy enterprise, we received domain admin in four hours - Kerberoasting plus a weak password for service earnings AD. Standard story, nothing interesting. But between the enterprise network and the SCADA segment there was a firewall that only passed the Modbus TCP to the...
  2. Depov

    Hidden C2 Data Channels: DNSing Tuning and HTTP Clitt Points from Customization to Detect

    At red team, operations in the financial sector, we raised dnscat2 on the rented VPS, prescribed the NS delegation and chased the teams through TXT recordings for two days, simultaneously unloading hashes from NTDS.dit. Suricata was silent on the perimeter. SIEM is not a single alerta. SOC...
  3. Depov

    Segmentation and protection of OT networks: Purdue Model, Industrial DMZ and Zero Trust for ICS

    At the audit of the petrochemical plant last year, we found Modbus/TCP traffic from the Siemens S7-1200 and HMI panels in the same VLAN with an enterprise file server. From the compromised laptop of the contractor in the IT segment to the recording of the held values in the controller-registers...
  4. Depov

    Steganography in malware: how APT-groups hide C2-channels and peloads in images

    When the Zero.T bootloader downloaded three BMP files from a C2 server, the corporate DPI system missed them without a single alert. Three ordinary pictures. Each contained modules of the Enfal ecosystem, packed in junior bats of pixels. According to Securelist, Zero.T is one of at least eight...
  5. Depov

    Attacks through stolen account details: kill chain from styler log to domain admin

    For the past year, I have been dismantling the dumps of infostlers - archives from Telegram channels and log marketplaces - and in each second I find the existing VPN or RDP accounts of corporate networks. Not test, not overdue - workers. According to Verizon DBIR 2025, the stolen accounts...
  6. Depov

    Pentest ICS TP: kill chain from the corporate network to the controller registers

    At the petrochemical facility in 2024, the task was specifically: to check whether the attacker from the corporate network will get to the PLC, which manages the refived convoy. After 14 hours, I read the hold-checks of the controller through the Modbus TCP - without a single alerte from the...
  7. Depov

    Bcrypt Breaking Passwords: How Hashes with Dragonica Are Leaked and Why It’s Easier Than It Seems

    At the CTF last year, the dump of the database of the private server Dragonica appeared - about 40 thousand accounts, bcrypt-hashi with cost factor 10. The organizers laid two days for the cracking stage. Two RTX 3090, rockyou dictionary plus custom-made gamelist with mutation rules - and in 14...
  8. Depov

    Cloud imconfiguration as a vector of attack: a complete map of threats and protection of AWS, Azure and GCP

    99% of cloud security incidents are the fault of the client, not the provider. This is Gartner (Through 2025, original publication 2019), quoted by CybelAngel. Not zero-day and not APT-grouping: enough one forgotten tick in the access settings. Large businesses simultaneously hold thousands of...
  9. Depov

    Zero Trust Network Microshenement: a Practical Guide to Implementation

    In three of the five microsegmentation projects that I have audited over the past year and a half, within the created segments there was the “permit any any” rule. Formally, there is a segmentation of the network, in the report for the leadership, the architecture of zero trust is beautifully...
  10. Depov

    Ransomware in 60 minutes: how Akira and Medusa/Storm-1175 accelerated attacks and how to detect them

    According to CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025, the average time of the lateral movement after initial access in 2024 is 62 minutes. A year earlier, there were 84. Record - 51 seconds from foothold before moving over the network. Fifty-one seconds. Two groupings set this pace: Akira with...
  11. Depov

    Detection of APT attacks: SIEM, EDR, NDR and Threat Hunting – full protection map in 2026

    Business logic of APT: why the attacker stays in the network for months Before dismantling detection tools, it is necessary to understand the motivation. APT-group is not an accidental hacker with ransomware-tuliki. For advanced threat threat is a long-term operation with a specific purpose...
  12. Depov

    Information Security Maturity Models: CMMC, C2M2, SSE-CMM and BSIMM – selection of framework and self-assessment

    In three years, I have conducted a gap analysis on four different maturity models for twelve organizations – from Defense Industrial Base subcontractors to energy companies with an OT segment. The result is the same: the team spends a month filling out scorcards, the guide receives a PDF with a...
  13. Depov

    SAML Authentication Attacks: XML Signature Wrapping, Golden SAML and bypassing the federal SSO

    SAML-Floy through the eyes of an attacker For the SAML pencilator, there is a trust chain between three participants: User's browser (User Agent), Service Provider (SP) and Identity Provider (IdP). 1. The user comes to SP, SP generates AuthnRequest and sends a redirect to IdP 2. IdP...
  14. Depov

    Bypassing ML detectors to IDS: adversarial-attacks and testing the robustness of models

    How IDS ML Detectors Make Traffic Decisions The ML-based NIDS operates on a three-stage pipeline. Understanding each step is critical for building an evasion attack - without this you will poking perturbations at random. Extracting signs. Network traffic is converted into numerical features -...
  15. Depov

    Modern methods of bypassing WAF in tasks with non-standard XSS

    Эволюция XSS и современные защиты Most likely, you already know what XSS is, but let’s repeat for the completeness of the picture. XSS (from English) Cross-Site Scripting) is a subtype of attack on web systems, consisting in the introduction of a malicious code page issued by the web system...
  16. Depov

    Bypass Secure Boot: attack techniques for the verification of the loader for the pentesters

    On the Red Team project last year, the task sounded the following task: to prove persistence below the OS level on the host with Windows 11 and included Secure Boot. SYSTEM received through Kerberoasting, reaching the workstation reached the field movement. Trying to put a modified downloader in...
  17. Depov

    iOS App Pentest: From Frida Installation to the Keybreak Curet

    On the audit of the fintech application for iOS, we stumbled in a three-layer jailbreak detection - file checks, sandbox recording in /private and analysis of loaded dylib for FridaGadget. Standard Team objection explore It led to a crash in 200 milliseconds: the app ended before Frida managed...
  18. Depov

    Reverse-engineering of iOS applications: IPA-analysis, class-dump and Frida through the eyes of a protector

    The place in the attack chain: why reverse an iOS application Reverse-engineering of iOS applications is not an end in itself. This is reconnaissance before attacking the server infrastructure. The acquatic examines binary for the sake of specific things: extract secrets (API keys, tokens, URL...
  19. Depov

    Malware development on Rust: stealth agent for red team, bypass EDR and comparison with C++

    A functionally identical plaid loader weighs 71.7 KB on C and 151.5 KB on Rust - the binary doubled. At the same time, according to a study by the Rochester Institute of Technology (2023, according to the Bishop Fox blog), automated means of analysis give much more false negatives on...
  20. Depov

    Nginx reverse proxy: C2 security and detection-checking for SOC

    Business logic of attack: the place of Nginx-redirector in kill chain Nginx reverse proxy for the security of C2 works at the Command and Control stage - the implant has already been delivered and fixed on the host. Full chain: initial access (phishing, operation of the perimeter service) →...
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